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Competitive Bidding In Medicare Advantage: 
If health insurance companies submitted 
competitive bids to offer Medicare coverage, 
President Obama says the government could 
save billions of dollars. 
What’s the issue? 
President Barack Obama proposes to save $177 
billion over ten years through a new competitive-
bidding system for “Medicare Advantage” plans. 
These are the private health plans that serve 
nearly one in four Medicare beneficiaries. In 2009 
these private plans will receive an average 14 per-
cent — or $12 billion — more than the govern-
ment would pay if beneficiaries enrolled in those 
plans had remained in the traditional Medicare 
program. 
The Obama administration’s plan goes beyond 
other proposals to cut payments to Medicare Ad-
vantage plans. (See Health Policy Brief: Medicare 
Advantage Plans,” April 29, 2009, for a fuller de-
scription of these plans, how they are currently 
paid, other proposals to change the payment sys-
tem, and arguments for and against doing so.)
Under the Obama administration’s proposal, 
companies in a given geographic area would sub-
mit bids to cover Medicare beneficiaries, as they 
do now. But they would then be paid the average 
of their bids, plus some additional amounts as de-
tailed below. Insurers submitting below-average 
bids would receive the average payment; they 
could use the difference between their bids and 
the average payment amount to provide addition-
al benefits to enrollees. Companies with above- 
average bids would charge members a premium 
to make up the shortfall between the average pay-
ment and their bids. 
“This approach will allow the market, not 
Medicare, to set [Medicare Advantage] payment 
rates,” the administration’s fiscal 2010 budget pro-
posal says. The Obama administration hopes to 
use the savings to help pay for expanding health 
insurance coverage to uninsured Americans in the 
context of overall health reform. However, savings 
could also be used to shore up the finances of the 
Medicare program, which faces extremely large 
unfunded future liabilities. 
But opponents say the large savings that the 
president’s plan proposes to generate could only 
be achieved through dramatic cuts in payments 
to the private insurers. If these large payment cuts 
took place, they say, the insurance plans would 
be forced to cut benefits, raise members’ fees, or 
simply drop out of the program. 
What’s the background?
The first private health plans within Medicare 
were introduced nearly three decades ago. At the 
time, supporters argued that health maintenance 
organizations, or HMOs, would provide better 
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health care at lower cost. Subsequently, new types 
of private plans were added to Medicare, includ-
ing so-called preferred provider organizations, or 
PPOs, and private fee-for-service plans. There have 
been long-standing differences among policymak-
ers over the merits of private plans. 
Over the years, Congress has grappled with 
the problem of how to pay the plans, especially 
in relation to the traditional Medicare program 
(where health care providers are paid according 
to fee-for-service, or FFS, payments). Any system 
to pay private plans has to take many factors into 
account. Health care costs and medical practice 
vary widely across the country, so it wouldn’t be 
feasible to have one level nationwide payment. 
What’s more, the health conditions of Medicare 
beneficiaries are not the same; for various reasons, 
healthier people tend to join private plans. That 
means they need less medical care overall, so they 
generally cost less than do beneficiaries in tradi-
tional Medicare. 
To address these variables, Congress devised a 
payment formula based on the average cost of car-
ing for beneficiaries in traditional fee-for-service 
Medicare in a particular county. Congress has 
also provided additional money to plans that have 
older, sicker patients or that operate in rural areas. 
This overall payment system has created several 
problems. In particular, in areas where traditional 
Medicare program costs are high, private health 
plans are paid even more than what it would cost 
if the beneficiaries enrolled in private plans had 
stayed in traditional Medicare. These overpay-
ments have driven up costs to U.S. taxpayers. 
Medicare officials and members of Congress 
have tried to resolve the situation by finding new 
ways to adjust the payment formula. President 
Obama’s proposal, described below, represents 
still another approach. 
This is not the first time competitive bidding 
has been proposed as a means of determining pay-
ment rates for private plans. In fact, the concept 
has a long and tortured history.
In the 1990s, the U.S. Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA), the predecessor of to-
day’s Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS), tried several times to have private insurers 
bid competitively to provide Medicare coverage. 
One of the first attempts to establish a competi-
tive-pricing experiment, or “demonstration proj-
ect,” was supposed to take place in Baltimore. Op-
position arose from state officials and members of 
Congress, who feared that the pressure on private 
plans to produce low bids would prompt them to 
cut benefits to enrollees. The controversy caused 
HCFA to cancel the project in 1996. 
The following year, HCFA attempted to test 
competitive bidding in Denver. However, insurers 
won a temporary court order to stop the project, 
arguing, among other things, that the government 
did not have authority to require all plans serving 
the Denver area to participate in the bidding dem-
onstration project. Soon after, Congress passed a 
bill prohibiting it. 
But already there were signs that the compet-
itive-bidding process would actually work as in-
tended to drive down payment rates to the plans. 
Before the Denver experiment was abandoned, 
HCFA received and opened some plan bids. They 
were 25–38 percent below the then-prevailing 
payment rate, according to a 2001 letter by Bryan 
Dowd published in Health Affairs. 
Trying yet again, in the Balanced Budget Act 
of 1997, Congress directed the secretary of health 
and human services to conduct a competitive-
pricing demonstration. Attempts were made to 
run competitive-bidding demonstration projects 
in Phoenix and Kansas City in 1999. But as Dowd 
and coauthors described in a 2000 Health Affairs 
article, opposition came from many quarters. In 
Arizona, for example, hospitals feared that pri-
vate-plan payment rates would fall so low that the 
plans would then squeeze payments to hospitals. 
Amid the political ruckus, in 1999 Congress re-
versed itself and placed a moratorium on any fur-
ther competitive-bidding demonstration projects. 
Once more into the breach: In 2003 Con-
gress mandated another competitive-bidding 
EXHIBIT 1
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Source: George Washington University for the Commonwealth Fund.
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demonstration for the private plans scheduled for 
2010. But as this policy brief is published in June 
2009 — just a few months before the project is 
supposed to begin — information about it still is 
scarce. A Medicare spokesman says the agency is 
developing options for the project, including how 
it would align with administration and congres-
sional health reform initiatives. 
How it would work: The Obama proposal for 
competitive bidding is different in several ways 
from past attempts. Although some details of 
the proposal have not been made public, the plan 
avoids some of the controversial features that de-
railed past experiments. For one, competitive bid-
ding would be rolled out nationwide and would 
not be a demonstration project limited to a few 
cities. 
Strictly speaking, the Obama proposal is not 
competitive bidding in the usual sense. Under 
a classic competitive-bidding arrangement, the 
government may request bids from companies to 
repair a bridge or provide some other kind of good 
or service. Typically, only the company that meets 
all of the government’s prerequisites, has the best 
performance record, and submits the lowest price 
for the work wins a contract. 
By contrast, the Obama proposal would use 
competitive bidding to set payment rates — not 
to select a single “winner,” or otherwise narrow 
down the number of plans that could participate 
in the Medicare program. All qualified plans in 
a given geographic area would submit bids, and 
all qualified plans could enroll beneficiaries. The 
point of the competitive bidding is that the aver-
age of the bids would then become the basic pay-
ment rate to plans. 
The major change the president’s proposal 
would make from the existing payment system is 
to sever any link between private-plan payments 
and the costs of the traditional Medicare program. 
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EXHIBIT 2
Share of 2009 Enrollment in Each State’s 2 Largest Medicare Advantage Plans
Source: Health Affairs analysis of May 2009 data from the U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
Notes: Percentages may be understated because they reflect enrollment in specific plans, as defined by CMS, not their parent companies. 
Does not include plans with 10 members or fewer. 
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In the current system, the government sets a rate, 
called a “benchmark,” for each county, which 
is based on the costs of traditional Medicare in 
that county. That amount is increased for plans 
with older, sicker members and other factors. The 
government pays the plans the amount they bid 
for providing hospital and ambulatory services 
under Medicare plus 75 percent of the difference 
between the bid and the adjusted benchmark, for 
bids below the benchmark. Since most bids fall 
below the benchmark, many plans receive these 
rebates. The plans must use the rebates to reduce 
beneficiary premiums or expand benefits. 
Under President Obama’s proposal, no bench-
mark would be set in advance. Instead, plans 
would bid, as they do now, on how much they 
expect it will cost them to provide health care. 
The government then would calculate the average 
bid in a county or region. Each plan’s bid would 
be “weighted” by its number of enrollees, so that 
the bids of plans with greater numbers of enroll-
ees would count more in terms of computing the 
average. Plans would then be paid the “weighted 
average” of the bids. Plans whose bids were above 
this number would have to charge enrollees addi-
tional premiums to make up the difference. Plans 
whose bids fell below the average would keep all 
of the difference to enhance benefits, reduce costs 
to enrollees, or some mix of both. 
There are several additional wrinkles. The 
government would continue to adjust payments 
according to a plan member’s age and health con-
ditions (a practice known as “risk adjustment”). 
This gives plans attracting older, sicker patients 
more money than plans with healthier, less costly 
members. There would also continue to be pay-
ment increases for insurers offering coverage in 
rural areas, where it can cost more to operate. 
But in any event, the new system would limit 
payments to no more than the 2009 benchmark 
amount under the current system indexed to the 
rate of growth in traditional Medicare spending. 
What’s the argument?
In favor of competitive bidding: The presi-
dent and his supporters say U.S. taxpayers can no 
longer afford to overpay health plans billions of 
dollars. A competitive-bidding system, they say, 
would save tens of billions of dollars annually 
and would bring Medicare Advantage payments 
closer to the private insurers’ actual costs. Back-
ers of the Obama proposal also argue that this 
approach would “level the playing field” between 
private plans and traditional Medicare. 
Administration officials also say a competitive-
bidding approach is the best way to reform pay-
ment to private health plans. They say it would 
save more than would be the case if Medicare 
Advantage payments were simply brought into 
line with the costs of traditional Medicare, as 
the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, or 
MedPAC, has recommended. The administration 
estimates its competitive bidding approach would 
save an estimated $177 billion over ten years. The 
reason, they contend, is that competitive bidding 
will drive Medicare Advantage payments below 
what traditional Medicare spends in some parts 
of the country — for example, where traditional 
Medicare program costs are high, and where there 
are more plans competing for enrollees’ business. 
By contrast, the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) has estimated that competitive bidding 
would save $159 billion over a decade. But the 
CBO assumes that insurers would submit bids 
similar to those submitted in the past, rather than 
significantly lower ones, as the administration 
forecasts. The CBO acknowledges that if the ad-
ministration is correct, and companies’ competi-
tive bids are significantly lower than previously, 
the savings would be greater.
Supporters of competitive bidding also point 
to the fact that the Obama administration’s pro-
posal would retain several beneficial features of 
the current payment system. One is the current 
risk-adjustment mechanism. Under this, plans 
would continue to receive extra money for car-
ing for older, sicker patients; this would encour-
age plans to care for these patients and not seek 
to avoid enrolling them. Supporters also say the 
new payment system would be good for Medicare 
beneficiaries in that it could provide them extra 
benefits or save them money. Plans that bid below 
the average bid amount could keep all of the dif-
ference — rather than the current 75 percent — as 
a rebate to be used for extra benefits for members, 
or could use the extra dollars to reduce members’ 
costs. 
Against competitive bidding: The health 
insurance industry’s leading trade association, 
America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP), op-
poses the Obama administration’s proposal. An 
AHIP spokesman says competitive bidding will 
result in sharply lower payments to Medicare Ad-
Estimated Average Monthly 
Value of Extra Medicare 
Advantage Benefits Not 
Available in Traditional 
Medicare, per Member, 
2019 (Congressional Budget 
Office)
Under current payment 
system
Under competitive bidding
$135
$0
Under competitive bidding 
with bonus payments
$46
5h e a lt h p ol ic y  br i e f m e dic a r e a dva n tage pl a ns
vantage plans. That in turn could force plans to 
cut benefits or raise prices for members. 
If, as the administration assumes, Medicare 
Advantage payments in some areas drop below 
the government’s traditional Medicare spending, 
some plans will not be able to afford to offer more 
attractive coverage than traditional Medicare. If 
that happens, beneficiaries would have little rea-
son to choose a private plan that costs more or of-
fers less than traditional Medicare. 
More broadly, congressional supporters of 
Medicare Advantage question whether a com-
petitive-bidding system will ever be put in place, 
given the opposition that competitive-bidding 
demonstration projects encountered in the past. 
They also doubt whether such a system would re-
ally work as intended to achieve savings. 
Others note that in some markets, only one or 
two plans dominate. A Health Affairs analysis of 
May 2009 current enrollment data shows that in 
10 states and the District of Columbia, at least half 
of the Medicare Advantage members are in only 
one plan. In 30 states, at least half of the Medicare 
Advantage members are enrolled in that state’s 
two largest plans (see Exhibit 2 map on page 3). 
Competitive bidding may create political 
difficulties as well. The Obama administration 
proposes to subject only private Medicare plans 
to competitive bidding — rather than requiring 
traditional Medicare to compete on price with 
private plans as well. That could undermine the 
administration’s argument that the government 
is creating a “level playing field” for public and 
private health plans.
 
What’s next? 
In June 2009, MedPAC is scheduled to provide 
Congress with a detailed analysis of alternative 
ways to revise the payment formula, including a 
competitive-bidding component. The commission 
has recommended since at least 2005 that the gov-
ernment pay private plans no more than what it 
spends in traditional Medicare. 
Meanwhile, members of the Senate Finance 
Committee are weighing several options for re-
ducing Medicare Advantage payments. Those 
options include combining the administration’s 
competitive-bidding proposal with bonus pay-
ments for plans that improve the quality of their 
members’ care. For example, there could be bo-
nuses paid to plans that provide care coordina-
tion, use electronic health records, reduce hospital 
admissions, or undertake other quality-improving 
measures.
To some degree, congressional action is likely 
to be tied to overall health reform. The Obama 
administration and some members of Congress 
want to use savings from the Medicare Advan-
tage program to help finance expansion of cover-
age to the uninsured. Others are likely to argue 
for putting these savings toward shoring up the 
Medicare program — for example, the Hospital 
Insurance, or Part A, Trust Fund, which under the 
most recent projections by Medicare trustees may 
be exhausted in 2017. Key congressional commit-
tees have vowed to have health reform legislation 
on the floor of Congress this summer, with the 
hope of passing bills before the August recess and 
enacting them into law later this year.
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